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THE STABILISATION OF EQUILIBRIA IN EVOLUTIONARY
GAME DYNAMICS THROUGH MUTATION: MUTATION
LIMITS IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES
JOHANN BAUER, MARK BROOM, AND EDUARDO ALONSO
Abstract. The multi-population replicator dynamics (RD) can be considered
a dynamic approach to the study of multi-player games, where it was shown to
be related to Cross’ learning, as well as of systems of coevolving populations.
However, not all of its equilibria are Nash equilibria (NE) of the underlying
game, and neither convergence to an NE nor convergence in general are guar-
anteed. Although interior equilibria are guaranteed to be NE, no interior equi-
librium can be asymptotically stable in the multi-population RD, resulting,
e.g., in cyclic orbits around a single interior NE. We introduce a new notion of
equilibria of RD, called mutation limits, which is based on the inclusion of a
naturally arising, simple form of mutation, but is invariant under the specific
choice of mutation parameters. We prove the existence of such mutation limits
for a large range of games, and consider a subclass of particular interest, that
of attracting mutation limits. Attracting mutation limits are approximated by
asymptotically stable equilibria of the (mutation-)perturbed RD, and hence,
offer an approximate dynamic solution of the underlying game, especially if
the original dynamic has no asymptotically stable equilibria. In this sense,
mutation stabilises the system in certain cases and makes attracting muta-
tion limits near-attainable. Furthermore, the relevance of attracting mutation
limits as a game theoretic equilibrium concept is emphasised by a similarity
of (mutation-)perturbed RD to the Q-learning algorithm in the context of
multi-agent reinforcement learning. In contrast to the guaranteed existence of
mutation limits, attracting mutation limits do not exist in all games, raising
the question of their characterization.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has contributed significantly to our understanding of a
wide range of biological, e.g., [7, 34], and social phenomena, as shown by the vast
research into the evolution of cooperation and eusociality, e.g., [3], or the problem of
collective action, e.g., [39]. The evolutionary game theoretic approach, formulated
in [34], initially assumed a single population with intrapopulation interaction and
competition for reproduction, resulting in the concept of the evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS), a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept, where a strategy is
said to be evolutionarily stable if it outperforms any other newcomer strategy in a
population consisting almost entirely of players playing the former.
While the intuition underlying the notion of an ESS is dynamic, its main definition
is usually given in static terms. In an effort to capture the dynamic intuition of
the ESS concept, the continuous time replicator dynamics (RD), provided by [49],
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relates the ESS to certain stationary points, [26], albeit lacking a complete charac-
terization. In its usual formulation, it captures the single population setting with
pairwise intrapopulation interactions. However, just as the concept of an ESS has
been extended to the multi-population, or multi-species, setting, e.g., [14], so has
RD been formulated and analysed in the multi-population setting with intrapopula-
tion competition (for reproduction) but interpopulation interactions (determining
reproductive advantage), e.g., [53]. Forms of multi-population RD have been em-
ployed in the analysis of coevolutionary systems, such as mutualism [4], antagonistic
coevolution of host-parasite systems [37,47], of institutional ecosystems [23], of the
evolution of a population’s sex ratio [2], or the coevolution of social behaviour and
recognition [46]. It has further been linked to Cross’ learning, a simple type of
reinforcement learning [8].
In the context of potentially very large systems, e.g., complex ecosystems or multi-
agent systems, multi-population RD is of special interest because a population’s
composition evolves exclusively depending on the payoffs from interactions, but
independent of any information about the other populations’ payoffs, their com-
positions, or indeed their very existence. The latter specifics affect a population’s
composition only through their effect on its payoffs. Borrowing the term from [22],
we call this property of RD its uncoupledness.
In spite of RD leading to payoff-improving or even equilibrium states in certain
cases, there are intuitively simple games, for which neither an ESS exists nor RD
reaches any Nash equilibrium, exhibiting periodic limit or general non-convergent
behaviour instead: In the usual rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game, RD has exclu-
sively periodic orbits in the single population case and the only Nash equilibrium,
an interior point, is not approached from any initial state, e.g., [7], and a range of
(un)-stable situations can result [27]. Further, the two population setting results in
periodic orbits, as well, and therefore does not reach the interior Nash equilibrium
either. An analogue result holds for the matching pennies game, e.g., [53]. Indeed,
it has been shown in [22] that no uncoupled dynamics, in particular RD, can be
converging to a Nash equilibrium for all possible games. For our understanding of
actual biological populations, this periodicity is not necessarily problematic. On
the contrary, periodic population dynamics similar to the single-population RPS
case have been observed in nature, e.g., in the common side-blotched lizard (Uta
stansburiana) [45]. For our understanding of the conditions of behavioural conver-
gence in multi-agent systems and their ability to solve large-scale problems such
periodic behaviour is less desirable.
Although RD is intended to capture the idea of evolutionary selection, and thus is
inspired by evolution, it treats mutation, an arguably central process of evolution
and one of the main generators of the diversity on which selection operates, as an
extremely rare event, to the degree that it is actually absent from the formulation of
the dynamics, especially in the case of multiple populations, e.g., [53]. Approaches
which include mutation mainly focus on the single population case [1, 5, 6, 9, 25,
29, 40], consider a payoff-adjusted RD, or a discrete time process [10], or a single
discrete population [28,52], while we are not aware of an analysis of continuous-time
multi-population RD with mutation, apart from [42] where certain approximations
to multi-population RD are considered, with a different focus however and not
linked to mutation.
We demonstrate that accounting for mutation in multi-population RD can fun-
damentally change the properties of the dynamics, i.e., preclude any periodicity
in certain cases and, furthermore, guarantee convergence to states close to Nash
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equilibria, which would not be reachable under standard RD. Note that the non-
existence result in [22] does not directly apply to such mutation dynamics, as it
only considers Nash-convergence.
Our main interest, therefore, lies with the derivation of an uncoupled dynamics,
which, on the one hand, explicitly considers mutation and, on the other hand, is
as close as possible to standard RD, and with the analysis of how this mutation
mechanism affects the position and stability of equilibria compared to the standard
(multi-population) RD. The resulting mutation mechanism with spontaneous muta-
tions from one type to another is of course not appropriate for all biological mutation
processes. In a biological population, such spontaneous mutation between a finite
number of types occurs, e.g., for single nucleotide polymorphisms, where alleles
differ by only one nucleotide, with the number of possible single nucleotide poly-
morphisms at that position restricted to four. Furthermore, such point mutations
are known to occur with a non-negligible probability [12,15] and can be significant
factors in diseases, [15,38], e.g., sickle cell anaemia, [13,33], which also interacts with
malaria parasites, [32], cystic fibrosis, [19], or β thalassemia, [11,44], and further in
human cancer cells, [17,36]. There is further evidence that in Drosophila most such
nonsynonymous point mutations are deleterious, while the rest are slightly dele-
terious, near-neutral, or weakly beneficial, [43], suggesting that a weak selection
assumption as we employ can be reasonable for persisting polymorphisms. Consid-
ered as a learning dynamics, modifications of multi-population RD have been shown
to be linked to so-called Q-learning, a more sophisticated reinforcement learning
algorithm, [51]. In particular, the resulting modification can be interpreted as a
mutation-like term.
The inclusion of mutation should not only further our understanding of coevolution-
ary multi-population systems, such as ecosystems. Its ability to stabilise equilibria
for any non-zero mutation rate, and thereby make them attainable by an uncoupled
dynamics, should also be useful in the study of game theoretical solution concepts,
such as ε-Nash equilibria, [18], and the formulation of conditions for the conver-
gence of learning in multi-agent systems.
We proceed by introducing the standard multi-population RD, i.e., without muta-
tion, and recounting some stability properties of its equilibria and their relation to
game theoretic concepts, such as Nash equilibria and evolutionary stability.
We then introduce mutation and give a heuristic derivation of the specific form of
mutation we consider, defining a replicator-mutator dynamics (RMD), the equilibria
of which we call mutation equilibria. For fixed mutation parameters, we prove the
existence of equilibria of RMD, their ε-Nash property, and their uniqueness and
asymptotic stability under very high mutation.
We proceed by defining the concept of limits of mutation equilibria for vanishing
mutation, which we call mutation limits. Mutation limits and their properties are
independent of any choice of specific mutation parameters. We prove the existence
of mutation limits for all systems with continuously differentiable fitness functions
and give a sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium to be a mutation limit.
In order to address the question of reachability of mutation limits, we define the
notion of an attracting mutation limit based on the asymptotic stability of the
mutation equilibria by which it is approximated. Such attracting mutation limits
are reachable in the sense that for any choice of mutation parameters there is an
asymptotically stable mutation equilibrium arbitrarily close to the mutation limit.
We further provide a sufficient condition for a Nash equilibrium to be an attracting
mutation limit. In particular, all evolutionarily stable states are attracting mutation
limits, but not all attracting mutation limits are evolutionarily stable, showing the
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notion to be a strictly weaker property than evolutionary stability. We conclude by
giving a necessary condition for attracting mutation limits, ruling out hyperbolic
interior equilibria.
2. Multi-population Replicator Dynamics
In the following we consider the situation where we have a finite set of populations
I “ t1, 2, . . . , Nu and each population i consists of a finite number of types which
we enumerate and denote by Si “ t1, 2, . . . , niu. Note that types are population-
specific and numbers do not identify types across populations. The composition of
a population i is then given as a vector xi such that xih ě 0 gives the frequency of
a type h P Si in population i. Thus, the set of possible compositions of population
i is given as:
∆i “
#
xi P R
ni
ě0
ˇˇˇ
ˇˇ ÿ
hďni
xih “ 1
+
For convenience, we denote the Cartesian product of the ∆i (i “ 1 . . .N) by ∆, i.e.,
∆ “
Ś
iďN ∆i, and denote by ∆
˝ the interior of ∆, i.e., @i ď N, h ď ni : xih ą 0.
Furthermore, we set S “ tpi, hq|i P I and h P Siu, such that ∆ Ă R
S . The state of
the multi-population model then is a description of the frequencies of the different
types in the populations, i.e., it is given by some x P ∆.
We assume that for each population i P I and each type in that population h P Si we
have a function fih P C
1pU,Rq, for U Ą ∆ open, describing the reproductive rate or
fitness fihpxq of that type in a given state x P ∆ and we define population i’s average
fitness as f¯ipxq “
ř
hďni
xihfihpxq. It should be noted that fitness is frequency-
dependent in replicator dynamics models and not affected by population sizes. We
further assume that there is no intraspecific interaction affecting fitness in a type-
specific manner, i.e., the fitness values of types in population i are independent of
the composition of population i or B
Bxik
fihpxq “ 0 (i P I, h, k P Si) in keeping with
the classic normal-form game settings.1 The standard multi-population replicator
dynamics, based on [48] and developed later, e.g., [53], is given by the following
system of differential equations:
9xih “ φihpxq :“ xih
`
fihpxq ´ f¯ipxq
˘
pi P I, h P Siq(RD)
We denote by Φ : Rˆ∆Ñ ∆ the flow of (RD), i.e., for x P ∆, Φp¨, xq : RÑ ∆, t ÞÑ
Φpt, xq is a solution of (RD) with Φp0, xq “ x. Due to our continuity assumption
on f , the existence and uniqueness of Φ is clear, e.g., [50, Thm 6.1].
2.1. Stationary points of the replicator dynamics. We give a short recount of
some well-known properties of (RD) with regards to game theory, beginning with
the main concept of game theory:
Definition 2.1 (Nash equilibrium). We call a state x˚ P ∆ a Nash equilibrium if
@i P I, zi P ∆iztx
˚
i u : f¯ipx
˚q ě f¯ipx
˚
´i, ziq,
where px˚´i, ziq denotes the state such that
rx˚´i, zisjk “
#
zik if j “ i,
x˚jk otherwise
.
We call x˚ P ∆ a strict Nash equilibrium if all inequalities in the Nash equilibrium
condition are strict.
1Note that this assumption is not essential for all results.
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Remark. It is clear that x˚ P ∆ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
@i P I, h ď ni : gihpx
˚q :“ fihpx
˚q ´ f¯ipx
˚q ď 0.
Note that gihpxq is exactly the coefficient of xih in (RD). Therefore, we can denote
the set of Nash equilibria by E “ tx P ∆ | gpxq ď 0u, where the inequality is
component-wise. A strict Nash equilibrium x˚ P ∆ in particular is a state where
each population consists of exactly one type, i.e., for each population i P I there is
exactly one type hi such that x
˚
ihi
“ 1.
The following relationships between Nash equilibria and stationary points of (RD)
are well-known:
Proposition 2.2. If x P ∆ is a Nash equilibrium, then x is a stationary point of
(RD), i.e., φpxq “ 0.
The other direction of this implication holds for interior stationary points, e.g. [53,
Thm 5.2]:
Proposition 2.3. If x P ∆˝ is a stationary point of (RD), then x is a Nash
equilibrium.
2.1.1. Stability properties of equilibria. Our special interest lies with the attain-
ability of Nash equilibria. Therefore, we restate a few stability properties of Nash
equilibria and stationary points of (RD) respectively.
Definition 2.4. We call a stationary point x P ∆ stable, if for every neighbourhood
U of x there is a neighbourhood V Ă U such that ΦpRě0, V q Ă U . We further
call a stationary point x P ∆ asymptotically stable if x is stable and there is a
neighbourhood V of x such that for all y P V we have Φpt, yq Ñ x for tÑ 8.
For stable stationary points we have the following:
Proposition 2.5. If x P ∆ is a stable stationary point of (RD), then x is a Nash
equilibrium.
A proof of this statement can be found in [53, Thm 5.2]. Note that this further
characterization is interesting if x P B∆, as stationary points on the boundary of ∆
are not necessarily Nash equilibria. Furthermore, it implies that stationary points
that are not Nash equilibria must be unstable and thus are harder to attain under
(RD). However, note that Nash equilibria do not have to be stable. We have the
following stronger characterization of asymptotically stable stationary points (with
a proof in, e.g., [53, Prop. 5.13]):
Proposition 2.6. A stationary point x P ∆ is asymptotically stable under (RD) if
and only if x is a strict Nash equilibrium.
For completeness, we would like to mention the relationship between stationary
points of (RD) and evolutionarily stable states, where we define evolutionary sta-
bility as in [53, p. 166], equivalently to [14], as follows:
Definition 2.7 (Evolutionary Stability). We call a state x˚ P ∆ evolutionarily
stable if for all y P ∆ (y ‰ x˚) there is some ε¯y ą 0 such that for all ε P p0, ε¯yq and
w “ εy ` p1´ εqx˚ we have some i P I with
f¯ipxi, w´iq ą f¯ipyi, w´iq.
It is well known that in the multi-population case the concept of evolutionary
stability is equivalent to that of a strict Nash equilibrium, e.g., [53, Prop. 5.1]:
Proposition 2.8. x P ∆ is evolutionarily stable if and only if x is a strict Nash
equilibrium.
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Therefore, we have that strict Nash equilibria are exactly the evolutionarily stable
states and exactly the asymptotically stable stationary points of (RD). The dynam-
ics (RD) will therefore not have any asymptotically stable points if the underlying
game does not have any strict Nash equilibria. Furthermore, no mixed Nash equi-
librium can be asymptotically stable, such that there is no guarantee that any Nash
equilibrium is attainable under (RD) if the game has only mixed Nash equilibria.
3. Introducing mutation
We consider the effect of mutation for two reasons. First, the idea of evolution is
intricately linked with mutation and mutation does not seem to be an extraordinary
event but is to be expected. Second, a central idea in the proof that the dynamics
(RD) has no interior asymptotically stable states relies on the fact that (RD) is
divergence free (after suitable modification) and therefore volume preserving, [26].
However, some games, such as the matching pennies game and the standard rock-
paper-scissors game, have only interior equilibria, while describing biologically rel-
evant interspecies interactions such as host-parasite systems. The kind of mutation
we consider results quite clearly in a dynamics with negative divergence. Of course,
this does not guarantee asymptotically stable interior equilibria, but it opens up
the possibility of such equilibria.
We will first give a motivational heuristic derivation of our specific replicator-
mutator dynamics from a more general form. Afterwards, we will consider the
properties of our specific dynamics and of its equilibria.
3.1. Replicator-Mutator Dynamics.
General mutation. In the standard replicator dynamics (RD), we assume that the
offspring of individuals of some type inherit that same type. In contrast, we consider
mutation as a process by which the offspring of a certain individual changes into
another type (of the same population) with some probability. More precisely, we
assume that the offspring of an h-type in population i mutates to a k-type in the
same population with some probability µikh ą 0, with
ř
kďni
µikh “ 1 for all
populations i, and therefore:
µihh “ 1´
ÿ
k‰h
µikh
In order to represent overall mutation more clearly, we introduce relative mutation
probabilities cikh and an overall mutation rate µi such that µikh “ µicikh (h ‰ k)
and thus:
µihh “ 1´ µi
ÿ
k‰h
cikh
Here, µi controls the overall strength of mutation, such that for µi “ 0 there is
no mutation at all, without affecting relative probabilities. We derive our specific
dynamics from the general multi-population replicator-mutator dynamics as given
in, e.g., [40],
9xih “
ÿ
kďni
µihkxikfikpxq ´ xihf¯ipxq(3.1)
yielding after substitution:
9xih “ xihpfihpxq ´ f¯ipxqq ` µi
ÿ
kďni
pcihkxikfikpxq ´ cikhxihfihpxqq(3.2)
This formulation emphasizes the similarity to the standard replicator dynamics
(RD) and how µi determines the extent to which (3.1) deviates from (RD).
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Weak selection-weak mutation limit. Recall that (RD) is invariant under the addi-
tion of a background fitness for all types of a population, a property which (3.1)
does not have. We therefore derive a version which is invariant under the addition
of a constant background fitness. For convenience, let si
´1 denote some background
fitness.2 Formulating (3.1) with a modified fitness function f˜ih : x ÞÑ fihpxq ` si
´1
and suitable substitution yields a dynamics with explicit background fitness:
9xih “ φihpxq `
µi
si
ÿ
kďni
`
si pcihkxikfikpxq ´ cikhxihfihpxqq ` cihkxik ´ cikhxih
˘
Analogous to [26], we consider a weak selection-weak mutation limit, where the
background fitness tends to infinity, i.e., the selection pressure goes to zero si Ñ 0,
and mutation occurs on the same order as selection, i.e., µi Ñ 0, such that overall:
µi
si
ÑMi ą 0
This yields the following weak selection-weak mutation limit of (3.1), which is
invariant under addition of background fitness,
9xih “ xihpfihpxq ´ f¯ipxqq `Mi
ÿ
kďni
pcihkxik ´ cikhxihq(3.3)
where we refer to Mi as the mutation rate in population i. Note that (3.3) can also
be derived from a discrete selection-mutation equation, [26].
Additionally, we assume that the mutation probabilities only depend on the target
type, i.e., cihk “ cihl (@i, h, k ‰ h, l ‰ h), and we can write cih instead of cihk and
that the mutation rate is the same for every population, replacing Mi with M ,
resulting in the following:3
Replicator-Mutator Dynamics. For some fixed c P ∆˝ and M ě 0, the replicator-
mutator dynamics (RMD) is given by:
9xih “ φ
M
ih pxq :“ xihpfihpxq ´ f¯ipxqq `Mpcih ´ xihq(RMD)
It is clear that we obtain (RD) forM “ 0. We denote by ΦM : Rˆ∆Ñ ∆ the flow
of (RMD), i.e., for x P ∆, ΦM p¨, xq : R Ñ ∆, t ÞÑ ΦM pt, xq is a solution of (RMD)
with ΦM p0, xq “ x.
Remark. Note that ΦM also depends on our choice of c. Throughout this section,
we will consider some arbitrary but fixed c P ∆˝ and the defined concepts will
depend on that choice. However, we will proceed to properties of (RMD) which
are invariant under the choice of c later on.
Definition 3.1. We call x P ∆ with φM pxq “ 0 a mutation equilibrium for M . For
shortness, we call xM a mutation equilibrium if it is a mutation equilibrium for M .
Definition 3.2. We call a sequence pxnqnPN Ă ∆ a sequence of mutation equilibria
if there is a sequence pMnqnPN Ă Rą0 with
i) Mn Ñ 0 for nÑ8
ii) and xn is a mutation equilibrium for Mn, i.e., φ
Mnpxnq “ 0, for all n P N.
For ease of notation, we write such a sequence as pxM qMą0.
Under suitable assumptions, such sequences represent the change of a coevolution-
ary system under decreasing mutation rates, and we will be especially interested in
the limits of such sequences of mutation equilibria and in their properties.
2Here, si can be seen as representing the selection pressure on that particular trait.
3 Although we consider M as independent of the population, population-dependent mutation
parameters Mi are mostly compatible with the present arguments, but would render proofs overly
technical.
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3.2. Existence of stationary points with mutation.
Lemma 3.3. For all M ą 0 and c P ∆˝ there is x P ∆˝, such that x is a stationary
point of the replicator-mutator dynamics (RMD), i.e., φM pxq “ 0.
Proof. Note that the vector field φM points towards the interior of ∆ for all x P B∆.
We thus have that for all x P B∆ and all t ą 0, ΦM pt, xq P ∆˝, and thus ∆ is
forward-invariant under the flow ΦM , in particular, ΦM pRą0,∆q Ă ∆
˝. Further-
more, it is clear that ∆ is nonempty, convex and compact. Using Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem, we can now use that if a nonempty, convex compact set is forward-
invariant under a flow, then it contains a fixed point, e.g., [50, Lemma 6.8]. With
ΦM pRą0,∆q Ă ∆
˝, we have that the fixed point has to be in ∆˝. 
The following definition, e.g., as given by [18], will be useful in our later investiga-
tion:
Definition 3.4 (ε-Equilibrium). For some ε ą 0, we call a state xε P ∆ an ε-
equilibrium if
@i P I, h ď ni : fihpx
εq ´ f¯ipx
εq ď ε .
In relation to ε-equilibria we state the following property:
Lemma 3.5. Let xM be a mutation equilibrium, then xM is an ε-equilibrium of
the underlying game for ε “M , in particular:
@i P I, h ď ni : fihpx
M q ´ f¯ipx
M q ăM
Proof. For pi, hq P S, we have that
0 “ φMih px
M q “xMih pfihpx
M q ´ f¯ipx
M qq `Mpcih ´ x
M
ih q
ąxMih pfihpx
M q ´ f¯ipx
M qq ´MxMih
and thus, with xM P ∆˝:
fihpx
M q ´ f¯ipx
M q ăM

Together with the continuity of f , we have the following:
Corollary 3.6. Let pxM qMą0 be a sequence of mutation equilibria and x
˚ an ac-
cumulation point for M Ñ 0. Then x˚ is a Nash equilibrium.
3.3. Mutation equilibria for high mutation rates. We consider some specific
properties under high mutation rates which illustrate the effect of mutation on the
number and stability of equilibria through its effect on the Jacobian of the replicator
dynamics. Note that all equilibria of (RMD), irrespective of the specific choice of
M ą 0, lie in the interior of ∆ and that φM points inward on B∆. We can therefore
consider (RMD) as a dynamics on ∆˝. We can further, for all populations i, replace
xini with
`
1´
ř
kăni
xik
˘
, and thus proceed to the resulting reduced system φ˜M ,
which is then defined on the Cartesian product of the pni´1q-simplices. For ease of
notation, we will still use ∆ to denote this reduced space. Thus, questions regarding
the stability of a mutation equilibrium xM P ∆˝ can be treated by considering the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian Dφ˜M . In particular, due to the Hartman-Grobman
theorem, e.g., [41, 50], we have the following useful characterization:
Remark 3.7. Let xM be a hyperbolic equilibrium of (RMD), and of the reduced
system φ˜M equivalently, i.e., all eigenvalues of Dφ˜M pxM q have non-zero real part.
Then xM is asymptotically stable if and only if all eigenvalues of Dφ˜M pxM q have
negative real part, e.g., [50, Thm 6.10]. In particular, all eigenvalues of Dφ˜M pxM q
have negative real part, if and only if all eigenvalues of Dφ˜pxM q have real part
smaller than M , due to Dφ˜M “ Dφ˜´M ¨ Id.
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With this observation, we obtain the following:
Lemma 3.8. There is M ě 0 such that for all M ąM the stationary points of the
replicator-mutator dynamics (RMD) are asymptotically stable. In particular, Dφ˜M
is regular everywhere on ∆.
Proof. Note that all eigenvalues of Dφ˜ are bounded on ∆, in particular the real
parts of the eigenvalues are bounded, as well. Then let M be an upper bound on
all real parts of the eigenvalues of Dφ˜ on ∆˝, i.e.:
M “ sup tℜpλq | λ P σpDφ˜pxqq, x P ∆u
Let xM P ∆˝ be a mutation equilibrium for someM ąM . As noted, the Jacobian of
φ˜M satisfiesDφ˜M pxq “ Dφ˜pxq´M ¨Id for all x P ∆. In particular, for all eigenvalues
λM P σpDφ˜M pxM qq we have that λM `M P σpDφ˜pxM qq and hence ℜpλM q `M ď
M , and thus ℜpλM q ă 0. Therefore, all eigenvalues of Dφ˜M pxM q have strictly
negative real parts and with remark 3.7, xM is asymptotically stable. 
Remark. Note that that the M in the previous lemma 3.8 is independent of the
choice of c P ∆˝, thus giving a lower bound on the mutation rate above which all
equilibria are asymptotically stable independent of c P ∆˝.
3.3.1. Uniqueness of mutation equilibria for high mutation rates. For very high
mutation (M ąM) we further obtain that mutation equilibria are unique and that
there is a continuously differentiable function mapping mutation rates to mutation
equilibria. We first consider the following lemma:
Lemma 3.9. Let c P ∆˝ and M from lemma 3.8. Let xM be a mutation equilibrium
for some M ą M . Then there is a unique function M : pM,8q Ñ ∆ such that
MpMq “ xM and for all m P pM,8q, Mpmq is a mutation equilibrium for m. In
particular, M is continuously differentiable and Mpmq
mÑ8
ÝÑ c.
This is denoted corollary A.4 in the appendix where the proof is given.
Note that this does not guarantee any uniqueness of equilibria, yet, only the unique-
ness of functions passing through a given equilibrium. The uniqueness of mutation
equilibria for high mutation rates is then obtained in the next step from the fact
that we have uniqueness at least for some mutation rate:
Proposition 3.10. Let c P ∆˝ and M from lemma 3.8. For all M ą M ,
the replicator-mutator dynamics (RMD) has a unique mutation equilibrium. The
unique map M : M ÞÑ xM is continuously differentiable on pM,8q.
This is denoted proposition A.5 in the appendix where the proof is given.
Remark 3.11. Note that the main achievement of proposition 3.10 is to extend
the uniqueness of equilibria beyond any Lipschitz constant of φ˜ to pM,8q, i.e., to
the interval where Dφ˜M is guaranteed to be regular. Furthermore, if Dφ˜M pxM q is
invertible for all M P pa,8q and corresponding mutation equilibria xM then the
uniqueness extends to pa,8q. In fact, if a “ 0 then there is a unique sequence of
mutation equilibria pxM qMą0 for c P ∆
˝ since it is induced by the function M.
For a fixed c P ∆˝ and a sufficiently high mutation rate, the unique mutation equi-
librium will be arbitrarily close to c. Therefore, if we were interested in finding
the mutation equilibrium for a sufficiently high mutation rate, we could choose an
initial point close to c and the dynamics (RMD) would converge to the asymptot-
ically stable mutation equilibrium. The uniqueness on pM,8q further enables us
to lower the mutation rate almost to M without losing uniqueness and asymptotic
stability.
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4. Mutation limits
In our previous considerations, we assumed fixed relative mutation probabilities
c P ∆˝. In particular, certain effects could depend on the specific choice of c, e.g., if
we picked c to coincide with a Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. However,
we are interested in properties that are independent of the specific choice of c. To
this end, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 4.1 (Mutation Limit). We call a connected compact set X Ă ∆ a muta-
tion limit, if for all c P ∆˝ there is a sequence of mutation equilibria pxM qMą0 Ă ∆
that converges to an element of X and X contains no proper subset with these
properties. We call x P ∆ a mutation limit (point) if the singleton set txu is a
mutation limit.
Remark. It is clear that every mutation limit X Ă ∆ is a subset of the set of Nash
equilibria, E , of the underlying game, as the limit of any sequence of mutation
equilibria is a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if it exists, it must be contained in
a connected component of E .
4.1. General existence of mutation limits. A question that arises from the
definition is that of the existence of mutation limit points. While we have shown
that for any fixed c P ∆˝ and any mutation rate M ą 0 there is a corresponding
mutation equilibrium and therefore the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem guarantees
the existence of a limit for vanishing mutation, this limit need not be independent
of the choice of c, and indeed it could be possible that there is no mutation limit
at all, neither a singleton set nor otherwise. The question, therefore, is whether
every game has at least one mutation limit point. To this question, we can give a
negative answer, as the following example shows:
Example 4.2. Consider a two-player game with the following payoff structure:
C1 C2
R1 1, 0 0, 1
R2 0, 1 1, 0
R3 0, 1 1, 0
It is clear that any Nash equilibrium of the game has the formˆˆ
1
2
,
t
2
,
1´ t
2
˙
,
ˆ
1
2
,
1
2
˙˙
with t P r0, 1s, where we give the strategy of the row player first. Excluding a few
special choices of c P ∆˝, for any generic c given as pcR,1, cR,2, cR,3, cC,1, cC,2q, every
sequence of mutation equilibria will converge to a Nash equilibrium of the above
form with:
t “
cR,2
cR,2 ` cR,3
It is therefore evident that this game has no mutation limit point, i.e., there is no
Nash equilibrium that is approached by mutation equilibria for all choices c P ∆˝.
However, for any Nash equilibrium x of the above form with t P p0, 1q there is a
c P ∆˝ such that x is approached by a sequence of mutation equilibria. Therefore,
the set of Nash equilibria is indeed a mutation limit.
In the above example, the set of all Nash equilibria turns out to be a mutation
limit. However in general, the set of Nash equilibria need not be connected. In
this context, the following result answers the question about the general existence
of mutation limits:
Proposition 4.3. For every f P C1pU Ą ∆,RSq there is a mutation limit.
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Proof. See appendix B. 
Note that this result does not require that there is no intraspecies interaction, i.e.,
it does not require B
Bxik
fihpxq “ 0 (@i P I, h, k P Si, x P ∆). In fact, the proof can
be quite easily generalized to other, not necessarily replicator dynamics.
From proposition 4.3, together with the prior remark that a mutation limit is
contained in a connected component of E , we obtain the following existence result
for dynamics with only a finite number of Nash equilibria:
Corollary 4.4. Let f P C1pU Ą ∆,RSq such that the set of Nash equilibria, E, is
finite. Then all mutation limits are mutation limit points and there is at least one
mutation limit point.
Note that the finiteness condition is particularly important for fitness functions
that are not derived from finite normal-form games.
4.1.1. A sufficient condition for mutation limits. We can further guarantee that
regular Nash equilibria, introduced in [21], cf. also [16], are mutation limit points,
where we employ the following equivalent definition, [42]:
Definition 4.5. We call a Nash equilibrium x P ∆ a regular equilibrium if the
reduced Jacobian of (RD) at x, Dφ˜pxq, has full rank.
In particular, all strict Nash equilibria are regular, [16, Cor. 2.5.3].
Lemma 4.6. Let x˚ be a regular equilibrium. Then x˚ is a mutation limit, i.e., for
all c P ∆˝, there is a sequence of mutation equilibria, pxM qMą0, such that x
M Ñ x˚
for M Ñ 0.
Proof. Note that Dφ˜px˚q is invertible and therefore, by the implicit function the-
orem, for every c P ∆˝, there is a continuously differentiable µ : p´ε, εq Ñ RN for
some ε ą 0, such that for M P p´ε, εq we have that φ˜M pµpMqq “ 0. Of course,
negative values of M are not interpretable as mutation rates and we consider them
here only for technical reasons of differentiability at 0.
If x˚ P ∆˝, then it is clear that we can choose ε such that µpr0, εsq Ă ∆, and
therefore a sequence of mutation equilibria pxM qMą0 Ă ∆ with x
M Ñ x˚ for
M Ñ 0.
Suppose that x˚ P B∆ and for some pi, hq P S we have x˚ih “ 0. Note that µ is
continuously differentiable and therefore for M P p´ε, εq,
0 “
d
dM
φMih pµpMqq
“
d
dM
ˆ
µihpMqgihpµpMqq
˙
`
d
dM
ˆ
Mpcih ´ µihpMqq
˙
“ gihpµpMqq
d
dM
µihpMq ` µihpMq
d
dM
gihpµpMqq
` pcih ´ µihpMqq `Mpcih ´
d
dM
µihpMqq
and hence for M “ 0,
0 “
d
dM
φMih pµpMqq
ˇˇ
M“0
“ gihpµp0qq
d
dM
µihp0q ` µihp0q
d
dM
gihpµp0qq ` pcih ´ µihp0qq ` 0pcih ´
d
dM
µihp0qq
“ gihpx
˚q
d
dM
µihp0q ` x
˚
ihlomon
“0
d
dM
gihpx
˚q ` pcih ´ x
˚
ihlomon
“0
q
“ gihpx
˚q
d
dM
µihp0q ` cih ą gihpx
˚q
d
dM
µihp0q .
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Thus, with x˚ being a Nash equilibrium, we have gihpx
˚q ď 0 and therefore
d
dM
µihp0q ě 0. Because of the strict inequality, we even have gihpx
˚q ă 0 and
d
dM
µihp0q ą 0. Therefore, we can choose ε such that µpr0, εqq Ă ∆ and a sequence
of mutation equilibria converging to x˚. 
Remark. It should be noted that the proof of the above result shows that there is a
continuously differentiable function mapping mutation rates to mutation equilibria
and that this function is unique. In other words, given a c P ∆˝, the sequence
approaches x˚ in a unique manner.
4.2. Attracting Mutation Limits. Up to this point we have considered equilibria
(or sets of equilibria) of (RD) such that for any c P ∆˝ and mutation rate M ą 0 a
mutation equilibrium of the respective (RMD) would be located arbitrarily close,
depending on M . We have so far ignored the stability properties of the mutation
equilibria arising nearby. If the mutation equilibrium arising nearby happens to be
asymptotically stable for some mutation rate M ą 0 and some c P ∆˝, then under
suitable initial conditions the system will converge to a state close to the mutation
limit. However, as with the notion of mutation equilibria, such behaviour of the
system is mostly of interest if it does not depend on a lucky choice of c, in particular
if nearby mutation equilibria turn out to by asymptotically stable for every choice
of c. In this case, the mutation limit would be approximated arbitrarily close in
all (RMD) only depending on M ą 0. This idea motivates the following formal
definition:
Definition 4.7 (Attracting Mutation Limit). We call a mutation limit X Ă ∆
attracting if for every c P ∆˝ and every sequence of mutation equilibria pxM qMą0
that converges to an element of X , there is m ą 0 such that for all M ă m, xM
is asymptotically stable. We call x P ∆ an attracting mutation limit (point) if the
singleton set txu is an attracting mutation limit.
4.2.1. A sufficient condition for attracting mutation limits. It is known that if x˚
is a strict Nash equilibrium, then Dφ˜px˚q has only real, strictly negative eigenval-
ues, e.g., [42, Lemma 1], and x˚ is therefore regular and thus a mutation limit.
Furthermore, we can show that x˚ is an attracting mutation limit:
Lemma 4.8. Let x˚ be a strict Nash equilibrium. Then x˚ is an attracting muta-
tion limit.
Proof. With the previous note, it is clear that x˚ is a mutation limit. It remains
to show that the mutation equilibria pxM qMą0 converging to x
˚ for any c P ∆˝
are asymptotically stable. Since all eigenvalues of the Jacobian at x˚ have strictly
negative real parts, and in fact are real, [42], we have that the eigenvalues of Dφ˜pxq
have strictly negative real parts in a neighbourhood of x˚, as the roots of a poly-
nomial vary continuously with its coefficients, e.g., [20], and Dφ˜ is continuous.
Therefore, in a neighbourhood of x˚, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian of φ˜M , with
Dφ˜M pxq “ Dφ˜pxq´MId, have strictly negative real parts for anyM ě 0, and thus
the xM are asymptotically stable, e.g., [41]. 
Remark 4.9. Since an equilibrium is strict if and only if it is evolutionarily sta-
ble, this result also implies that all evolutionarily stable equilibria are attracting
mutation limits.
The following example shows that attracting mutation limits are not necessarily
strict Nash equilibria, and hence that the concept of attracting mutation limits is
also weaker than evolutionary stability:
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Example 4.10. Consider the 2-by-2 matching pennies game given by the payoffs:ˆ
p1, 0q p0, 1q
p0, 1q p1, 0q
˙
The strategy profile pp1
2
, 1
2
q, p1
2
, 1
2
qq is a Nash equilibrium but not strict. However,
it is an attracting mutation limit, as proven in a forthcoming article.
4.2.2. A necessary condition for attracting mutation limits. The observation that
not all Nash equilibria are attracting mutation limits relies on the following:
Lemma 4.11. Let x˚ P ∆ be an attracting mutation limit. Then all eigenvalues
of the Jacobian Dφ˜px˚q have nonpositive real parts.
Proof. Suppose there is an eigenvalue of Dφ˜px˚q with a strictly positive real part.
Then there is ε ą 0 and a neighbourhood U of x˚ such that Dφ˜pxq has an eigenvalue
λ with ℜpλq ą ε for all x P U . Let pxM qMą0 be a sequence of mutation equilibria
converging to x˚ for some c P ∆˝. Then there is ε1 such that xM P U forM ă ε1. In
particular, we can choose ε1 ă ε. Then the Jacobian Dφ˜M pxM q, with Dφ˜M pxM q “
Dφ˜pxM q ´MId, has an eigenvalue with strictly positive real part, and xM is not
asymptotically stable, as it is not even stable, e.g., [24]. Therefore, x˚ is not an
attracting mutation limit. 
This result, together with the following example, then demonstrates that not all
Nash equilibria are attracting mutation limits:
Example 4.12. Consider the 2-by-2 coordination game given by:ˆ
p1, 1q p0, 0q
p0, 0q p1, 1q
˙
The strategy profile pp1
2
, 1
2
q, p1
2
, 1
2
qq is a Nash equilibrium, but its Jacobian has
eigenvalues with positive real parts and therefore, it is not an attracting mutation
limit.
5. Discussion
We have shown that a very simple form of mutation leads to qualitative changes
in the multi-population replicator dynamics. Furthermore, these changes do not
depend on the specific choice of parameters but are of a general character. Not
only do mutation limits exist for all continuously differentiable fitness functions,
mutation can also cause the dynamics to approximate equilibria that would not
be approximated without mutation, again independently of the choice of specific
mutation parameters, which is due to asymptotically stable equilibria arising close
to an original equilibrium. The closest results to our approach that we are aware of
are presented in [42], and if considered as an approximation to RD, certain aspects
of RMD are clarified by those results, as indicated. The results presented here
differ in that they show robustness in a system of families of approximations which
are not related to perturbed normal-form game payoffs and in that they focus on
the effects on the stability of equilibria, independent of the choice of the specific
approximation.
With respect to periodic behaviour in biological populations it should be noted
that the degree of stabilisation of RD depends on the mutation rate, resulting in a
very slow approach of an asymptotically stable mutation equilibrium and seemingly
periodic behaviour if mutation is low. In an empirical situation this can lead to
difficulties in distinguishing dynamics with truly periodic behaviour from ones with
only seemingly periodic behaviour if measuring on a (relatively) small time scale.
Furthermore, in small populations stochastic effects will play a significant role.
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Therefore, under very low mutation, empirical findings of periodic fluctuations can
be consistent with our results if measured in small populations on a small time
scale, such that any stabilising effects of mutation will be more apparent in large
populations on large time scales, or with sufficiently fast reproduction.
On the one hand, given the potential health impacts of even slight mutations on
organisms and the fact that such mutations occur with a non-negligible probabil-
ity, as mentioned earlier, and given further its role as a generator of variety on
which evolutionary selection operates, it is clear that it is worth including muta-
tion mechanisms in the study of populations, and one should expect results that
deviate potentially significantly from models without mutation.
On the other hand, given that the multi-population replicator dynamics has been
shown to be related to learning dynamics and that mutation-like terms have been
shown to arise in formulations of Q-learning algorithms, it is worth noting that our
results show that replicator-mutator dynamics have more desirable convergence
properties than the pure replicator dynamics, while remaining arbitrarily close to a
Nash equilibrium. Therefore, attracting mutation limits resulting from a replicator-
mutator dynamics can be considered a more suitable class of dynamic solution
approaches for games than the pure multi-population replicator dynamics.
As shown, attracting mutation limits do not exist for all games, and the characteri-
zation of their existence is therefore an open problem. We will address this problem
partially in forthcoming results on attracting mutation limits in the matching pen-
nies game, which can be considered a model of antagonistic coevolution. Further-
more, we have considered a specific form of mutation, and therefore the question
of which properties carry over to more complicated and more realistic mutation
mechanisms remains.
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Appendix A. Proof of proposition 3.10
The proof of proposition 3.10 relies on the implicit function theorem, which we
restate for convenience, e.g., as in [31, Thm 3.3.1]:
Theorem A.1 (Implicit Function). Let W Ă R, X Ă Rm be open and let ρ :
W ˆ X Ñ Rm, pw, xq ÞÑ ρpw, xq be a continuously differentiable function. Let
further pw1, x1q PWˆX be such that ρpw1, x1q “ 0 and the mˆm matrix B
Bx
ρpw1, x1q
be invertible.
Then there exist an open neighbourhood W1 Ă W of w
1, an open neighbourhood
X1 Ă X of x
1, and a continuously differentiable function F : W1 Ñ X1 such that
@w P W1 : ρpw,F pwqq “ 0. Furthermore, for all pw, xq P W1 ˆ X1 we have that
ρpw, xq “ 0 if and only if x “ F pwq.
For the proof of proposition 3.10 we will need a consequence of the implicit function
theorem, based on the following statement that we can extend an implicitly defined
function if the conditions of the implicit function theorem hold on the boundary of
its domain:
Lemma A.2. Let ρ : W Ă R Ñ X Ă Rm be continuously differentiable for W
open and X open, and let R : WR Ñ XR be continuously differentiable, with open
and convex WR ĂW and open XR Ă X, such that:
i) @v PWR : ρpv,Rpvqq “ 0;
ii) @pv, xq PWR ˆXR : ρpv, xq “ 0ô x “ Rpvq.
If for some sequence pvnqnPN Ă WR with vn Ñ v
1 P BWR XW and an accumula-
tion point x1 P X of pRpvnqqnPN, the matrix
B
Bx
ρpv1, x1q is invertible, then there is
a unique continuously differentiable extension of R with the above properties whose
domain is open and a proper superset of WR. In particular, pRpvnqqnPN is conver-
gent with limit v1.
Proof. Let pvnqnPN ĂWR with vn Ñ v
1 P BWRXW and let x
1 P X be an accumula-
tion point of pRpvnqqnPN, such that the matrix
B
Bx
ρpv1, x1q is invertible. Due to the
continuity of ρ on W ˆX , we have that ρpv1, x1q “ 0. With the implicit function
theorem, there are open neighbourhoods W 1 Ă W of v1, where we can require W 1
to be convex, and X 1 Ă X of x1 and a unique continuously differentiable function
S :W 1 Ñ X 1 with the corresponding properties i) and ii).
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We will show that there is N such that pRpvnqqněN Ă X
1: As x1 is an accumulation
point of pRpvnqqnPN, there are infinitely many n P N with Rpvnq P X
1, in particular
let RpvN q P X
1. Note that we can assume pvnqněN Ă W
1 as v1 P W 1 is the limit
of that sequence. Assume that there is some N 1 ą N with RpvN 1q R X
1 and
let N 1 be minimal. W.l.o.g. let N 1 “ N ` 1 and define v : r0, 1s Ñ W 1, t ÞÑ
p1´ tqvN ` tvN 1 . Then vpr0, 1sq ĂW
1 due to convexity. Consider that RpvN q P X
1,
with X 1 open. Therefore, there is some ε ą 0 with Rpvpr0, εsqq Ă X 1. However, with
our assumption, Rpvp1qq “ RpvN 1q R X
1. Then, with the complement of X 1 being
closed, there is a minimal t¯ such that Rpvpt¯qq R X 1. Then R˝v “ S ˝v on r0, t¯q, but
due to their continuity we then also have Rpvpt¯qq “ Spvpt¯qq and thus Rpvpt¯qq P X 1,
in contradiction to Rpvpt¯qq R X 1. Thus, RpvN 1q “ Rpvp1qq P X
1, in contradiction to
RpvN 1q R X
1. Overall, we then have pRpvnqqněN Ă X
1, and furtherRprvN , v
1qq Ă X 1
(assuming vN ă v
1). This implies that R “ S on WR XW
1 and T :“ R Y S is a
proper, continuously differentiable extension of R, with corresponding properties i)
and ii). In particular, due to pRpvnqqněN “ pT pvnqqněN , pRpvnqqnPN is convergent
with limit v1. 
The following lemma states that there is an implicitly defined function whose do-
main is such that the points at the boundary do not satisfy the conditions of the
implicit function theorem:
Lemma A.3. Let ρ : W Ñ X be as given in the implicit function theorem and
pw, xwq P W ˆX such that ρpw, xwq “ 0 and the matrix B
Bx
ρpw, xwq is invertible.
Then there exist open neighbourhoods W˚ ĂW of w, withW˚ convex, and X˚ Ă X
of xw, and a continuously differentiable function R˚ :W˚ Ñ X˚ such that:
i) @v PW˚ : ρpv,R˚pvqq “ 0;
ii) @pv, xq PW˚ ˆX˚ : ρpv, xq “ 0ô x “ R˚pvq;
iii) for all pvnqnPN ĂW
˚ with vn Ñ v
1 P BW˚ XW and every accumulation point
x1 P X of pR˚pvnqqnPN, the matrix
B
Bx
ρpv1, x1q is singular.
In particular, R˚ is a maximally defined such function.
Proof. Let R be the set of all continuously differentiable functions Rα : Wα Ñ
Xα, with Wα Ă W convex and Xα Ă X being open neighbourhoods of w and
xw, respectively, such that Rα satisfies i) and ii). Due to ρ being continuously
differentiable, B
Bx
ρ is regular in a convex, open neighbourhood of pw, xwq. With the
implicit function theorem, R is not empty. We define a partial order on R by the
set inclusion on the graphs of the functions Rα P R.
Let O be a non-empty completely ordered chain in R. Consider the function R1
defined by the graph:
ΓpR1q “
ď
RαPO
tpv,Rαpvqq | v PWαu
ThenW 1 “
Ť
RαPO
Wα ĂW andX
1 “
Ť
RαPO
Xα Ă X are open neighbourhoods of
w and xw and R1 :W 1 Ñ X 1 is a continuously differentiable function. Furthermore,
tWα |Rα P Ou is completely ordered by set inclusion as well and therefore, W
1 is
convex. It is clear that R1 satisfies i) as all Rα satisfy i). Let pv, xq PW
1ˆX 1. Then
there is Rα P O with v P Wα, x P Xα, and R
1pvq “ Rαpvq. Then, as Rα satisfies
ii), we have ρpv, xq “ 0ô x “ Rαpvq “ R
1pvq, and thus R1 satisfies ii). Therefore,
R1 P R, and with Zorn’s Lemma, R contains a maximal element R˚ : W˚ Ñ X˚,
such that R˚ satisfies i) and ii).
For iii), let pvnqnPN Ă W
˚ with vn Ñ v
1 P BW˚ X W and let x1 P X be an
accumulation point of pR˚pvnqqnPN. In particular, this implies W˚ Ă W . Assume
that the matrix B
Bx
ρpv1, x1q is invertible. With the previous lemma there is a proper
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extension of R˚ and R˚ is not maximal, a contradiction. Therefore, the matrix
B
Bx
ρpv1, x1q is singular. 
In order to apply the above lemma, for M ą 0, we rewrite (RMD) as
ρ : RˆX Ñ RS , pw, xq ÞÑ wφpxq ` pc´ xq(A.1)
with w “M´1. It is clear that ρpM´1, xq “M´1φM pxq and therefore ρpM´1, xq “
0ô φM pxq “ 0 and that ρ is continuously differentiable on RˆX with someX Ą ∆
open and bounded, depending on φ. Then we obtain lemma 3.9 as a corollary:
Corollary A.4. Let c P ∆˝ and M be as in lemma 3.8. Let xM be a mutation
equilibrium for some M ą M . Then there is a unique function M : pM,8q Ñ ∆
such that MpMq “ xM and for all m P pM,8q, Mpmq is a mutation equilibrium
for m. In particular, M is continuously differentiable and Mpmq
mÑ8
ÝÑ c.
Proof. Consider that for m ąM , DφM is invertible everywhere on ∆ due to lemma
3.8, and that for w “ m´1 with ρ from (A.1), the matrix B
Bx
ρpw, xq is invertible
whenever Dφmpxq is. Then let w “ M´1 and w “ M´1 for some M ą M . Then
applying the previous lemma to w, xM and ρ yields a continuously differentiable
function R : W Ñ ∆ with W Ă R and w P W . Furthermore, the previous lemma
guarantees that r0, wq Ă W because B
Bx
ρpv,Rpvqq is invertible @v P r0, wq. Thus,
M : pM,8q Ñ ∆ with m ÞÑ Rpm´1q is continuously differentiable and has the
desired properties. 
With this we can prove proposition 3.10:
Proposition A.5 (3.10). Let c P ∆˝ and M as in lemma 3.8. For all M ą M ,
the replicator-mutator dynamics (RMD) has a unique mutation equilibrium. The
unique map M : M ÞÑ xM is continuously differentiable on pM,8q.
Proof. As φ is Lipschitz, let Lφ be the best Lipschitz constant for φ. Since φ is
differentiable and ∆ is convex, we further have that
Lφ “ }Dφ}8,∆ :“ sup
xP∆
}Dφpxq} ěM
with M from lemma 3.8. Choose M 1 ą Lφ and consider for c P ∆
˝ and some s ą 0
the function FM 1,c : ∆Ñ ∆ with:
rFM 1,cpxqsih “ xih ` s
`
φihpxq `M
1pcih ´ xihq
˘
Then, we have that
rFM 1,cpxqsih ´ rFM 1,cpyqsih “xih ` s
`
φihpxq `M
1pcih ´ xihq
˘
´ yih ´ s
`
φihpyq `M
1pcih ´ yihq
˘
“p1´ sM 1qpxih ´ yihq ` s pφihpxq ´ φihpyqq
and thus
}FM 1,cpxq ´ FM 1,cpyq} ď|1´ sM
1|}x´ y} ` s}φpxq ´ φpyq}
ď|1´ sM 1|}x´ y} ` sLφ}x´ y}
“p|1´ sM 1| ` sLφq}x´ y} .
Choosing s such that sM 1 ď 1, we have that:
|1´ sM 1| ` sLφ “ 1´ sM
1 ` sLφ “ 1` spLφ ´M
1q ă 1
Hence, FM 1,c is a contractive mapping and has a unique fixed point x
M 1 P ∆˝.
Furthermore, every functionM from corollary A.4 satisfies thenMpM 1q “ xM
1
and
thus all such functions are identical yielding the uniqueness of mutation equilibria
for all M ąM .
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Appendix B. Proof of proposition 4.3
In order to prove proposition 4.3, we need to extend our (RMD) slightly, such that
we can allow more general mutation to occur. Recall that gihpxq “ fihpxq´f¯ipxq and
that then E “ tx P ∆ | gpxq ď 0u is the set of Nash equilibria, where the inequality
is component-wise.
Then let H “ C1p∆,RSą0q, and define for c P H , M ą 0:
rFM,cpxqsih “ xih ` s
˜
xihgihpxq `M
˜
cihpxq ´ xih
ÿ
kďni
cikpxq
¸¸
where i P I, h P Si. Note that for all s ą 0, the fixed points of FM,c are the
stationary points of a suitably generalized (RMD). In particular, if c P H is constant
on ∆, then the fixed points are exactly the mutation equilibria of (RMD) for a
suitably chosen M˜ . It is clear that for a choice of c P H , we can choose s ą 0 such
that for all M P p0, εsq, we have FM,cp∆q Ă ∆ and thus the set of fixed points is
non-empty. Therefore, we assume a suitable choice of s ą 0 (possibly depending
on c). For convenience, let us denote by F pFM,cq the set of fixed points of FM,c
for c P H and M ą 0, i.e.,
F pFM,cq “ tx P ∆ |FM,cpxq “ xu.
From the definition of a mutation limit, we extract the main property and say that
a set X Ă ∆ has the property pAq, if
pAq for all c P ∆˝, there is a sequence of mutation equilibria pxM qMą0 Ă ∆
that converges to an element of X .
We extend this notion to FM,c and say that a set X Ă ∆ has the property pA
1q, if
pA1q for all c P H and open U Ą X , there isM ą 0 such that F pFM,cqXU ‰ H.
Remark. If is clear the a set X has the property pA1q if and only if for every c P H
there is a sequence pxM qMą0 Ă ∆ such that px
M qMą0 converges to an element
of X and every xM in the sequence satisfies xM P F pFM,cq. With this it is also
clear that a set has the property pAq if it has property pA1q, due to c P ∆˝ being
equivalent to a constant function in H .
The proof of proposition 4.3 will proceed as follows: We first show that E has the
property pA1q. Next, we show that a set with the property pA1q contains a minimal
set with that property, and that an analog but slightly modified result holds for the
property pAq. We then show that a minimal set with the property pA1q is connected,
based on a proof by Kinoshita [30]. Thus, we have that E contains a minimal set
with the property pA1q, which must be contained in a connected component of
E . Finally this set is connected and in particular has the property pAq and hence
contains a minimal connected set with the property pAq, proving proposition 4.3.
Existence. We show first that any minimal set with the property pA1q, must be
contained in E :
Lemma B.1. Let X Ă ∆ be minimal with the property pA1q. Then X Ă E. In
particular, E has the property pA1q.
Proof. Assume that X Ć E . Let c P H and pMnqnPN Ă Rą0 be a null sequence, and
pxMnqnPN Ă ∆ convergent with limit x
˚ with xMn P F pFMn,cq for all n P N. From
our earlier note on the possibility of a constant choice of s ą 0 for all n P N, and
from the continuity of g and c, we have that for all i P I, h P Si, x
˚
ihgihpx
˚q “ 0
holds.
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We now show that x˚ P E : If x˚ P ∆˝, then for all i P I, h P Si, x
˚
ihgihpx
˚q “ 0
implies gihpx
˚q “ 0, i.e., x˚ P E . If x˚ P B∆, then let some pi, hq P S be such that
x˚ih “ 0, and let c˜i “ sup
 ř
kďni
cikpxq |x P ∆
(
. Then c˜i ă 8 and for M ą 0:
xMih “ rFM,cpx
M qsih “ x
M
ih ` s
˜
xMih gihpx
M q `M
˜
cihpx
M q ´ xMih
ÿ
kďni
cikpx
M q
¸¸
ą xMih ` s
˜
xMih gihpx
M q ´MxMih
ÿ
kďni
cikpx
M q
¸
ě xMih ` sx
M
ih
`
gihpx
M q ´Mc˜i
˘
Therefore, we have for all M ą 0:
0 ą sxMih
`
gihpx
M q ´Mc˜i
˘
ô 0 ą gihpx
M q ´Mc˜i ô Mc˜i ą gihpx
M q
Therefore, with M Ñ 0, we have gihpx
˚q ď 0, and overall x˚ P E . Thus X X E has
the property pA1q and so X is not minimal, a contradiction. From the fact that
x˚ P E , it is clear that E has the property pA1q. 
Minimality. We first show that the existence of a set with the property pA1q implies
the existence of a minimal such set, where the proof is fairly standard and adapted
from [35, Thm 7.3]:
Lemma B.2. Let a compact set X Ă ∆ have the property pA1q. Then it contains
a minimal compact set with the property pA1q.
Proof. The proof is based on Zorn’s lemma. Let C be the set of compact subsets
of X with the property pA1q, i.e.,
C “
 
K Ă X |K ‰ H and K is compact and has the property pA1q
(
,
and order C by reverse inclusion Ą. Let O Ă C be completely ordered. Then O
has the finite intersection property, as it is completely ordered by reverse inclusion
and its elements are compact. Therefore, K8 :“
Ş
O ‰ H and K8 is compact.
It remains to show that K8 has the property pA
1q: Assume K8 does not have the
property pA1q. Then there is a c P H and an open neighbourhood V of K8 such
that no FM,c (M ą 0) has a fixed point in V . For L P O, we have L Ć V because L
has the property pA1q. Then O1 :“ tLzV : L P Ou is a completely ordered collection
of compact sets (L is compact and V is open) with the finite intersection property,
inherited from the reverse inclusion ordering of O. Therefore, it has a nonempty
intersection K 18 Ă K8 Ă V but K
1
8XV “ H, which is a contradiction. Thus, K8
has the property pA1q and therefore K8 P C is an upper bound of O.
With Zorn’s lemma then, C has a maximal element, which is a minimal compact
subset of X with the property pA1q. 
For the existence of a mutation limit we will have to make a similar step, however
preserving connectedness:
Lemma B.3. Let a connected compact set X Ă ∆ have the property pAq. Then it
contains a minimal connected compact set with the property pAq, i.e., a mutation
limit.
Proof. Let C be the set of all compact connected (non-empty) subsets ofX with the
property pAq, partially ordered by Ą and O a completely ordered chain in C. Then
K8 “
Ş
KPOK is non-empty, compact and has the property pAq by an argument
completely analogous to the previous lemma.
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It remains to show that K8 is connected: Assume that K8 is not connected. Then,
there are open disjoint sets U1, U2, with K8 Ă U1YU2 “: U , with U open in X . X
and all K P O are compact and, with X being Hausdorff, also closed. Thus XzK
is open in X for K P O. Then, with
Ť
KPOXzK “ Xz
Ş
KPOK “ XzK8, we have
that tUu Y tXzK|K P Ou is an open cover of X , and there is a finite subcover
tUuYtXzKi|Ki P O, 1 ď i ď nu, as X is compact. Thus X “ U Y
Ť
1ďiďnXzKi “
U YXz
Ş
1ďiďnKi. As O is completely ordered by inclusion, we can assume that
K1 Ą Ki (1 ď i ď n) and we have that X “ U YXzK1. Thus K1 Ă U “ U1 Y U2,
and hence K1 is not connected, a contradiction. Therefore, K8 is connected and
K8 P C. With Zorn’s lemma the statement of the lemma follows. 
Connectedness. We gain connectedness as a necessary property of minimal sets
with the property pA1q, where the main idea of the proof is based on a proof by
Kinoshita [30] and relies on the “convexity” of H :
Lemma B.4. If K has the property pA1q and K “ pK1 Y . . . Y Ksq with the Kj
disjoint and compact, then some Kj has the property pA
1q.
Proof. Let K have property pA1q and K “ K1 Y . . .YKs with the Kj disjoint and
compact. Assume that no Kj has the property pA
1q. Then there are c1, . . . , cs P H
and neighbourhoods U1, . . . , Us of K1, . . . ,Ks with disjoint closures such that for
all M ą 0, F pFM,cj q X Uj “ H. Let further V1, . . . , Vs be strictly smaller neigh-
bourhoods, i.e., V j Ĺ Uj , and let U0 be a neighbourhood of ∆zpU1 Y . . . Y Usq
whose closure is disjoint from the V1, . . . , Vs, and c0 any function in H . Then
tU0, U1, . . . , Usu is an open cover of ∆ and with ∆ being a compact subset of a
topological vector space, there is a C8-partition of unity pi0, pi1, . . . , pis such that
pijpxq “ 0 (@x P ∆zUj), and
řs
j“0 pijpxq “ 1 (@x P ∆), e.g., [35, Thm 6.2]. The con-
vex combination, c¯, with c¯ : x ÞÑ
řs
j“0 pijpxqcjpxq, is an element of H . Considering
FM,c¯, we then have that FM,c¯pxq “ FM,cj pxq for x P Vj . Thus F pFM,c¯qXVj “ H for
1 ď j ď s for all M ą 0. Therefore, FM,c¯ has no fixed points in pV1Y . . .YVsq Ą K
for any M ą 0. This is a contradiction to the assumption that K has the property
pA1q. 
This result gives us the connectedness of minimal sets with the property pA1q:
Corollary B.5. Let X be minimal with the property pA1q. Then X is connected.
Overall, this proves the following:
Proposition B.6. There is a mutation limit. In particular, it is contained in a
connected component of E.
Proof. With lemma B.1, E has the property pA1q. With E being compact due to
g P Cp∆,RSq and E Ă ∆, and with lemma B.2, there is a minimal compact set
X 1 Ă E with the property pA1q. Furthermore, with corollary B.5, X 1 is connected.
With the property pA1q, X 1 also has the property pAq. With lemma B.3, X 1 contains
a minimal connected compact subset X Ă X 1 with the property pAq. By definition,
X is a mutation limit. 
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